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INTRODUCTION
On a boat trip from Boston to Philadelphia
Benjamin Franklin, the American statesman and
scientist, found himself in a tangling decision
problem when confronted with the delicious smell
of fried codfish coming out of the ship kitchen’s
window. Franklin was a strict vegetarian and his
next vegetarian meal was scheduled only within
an hour. Should he wait for a decent vegetarian
meal or should he take fish and chips
immediately? Although he was a vegetarian the
impulse of  his appetite was too strong for him.
He reconsidered his valuations about codfish on
the spot: ‘The codfish stomach probably is full of
small other little fishes. Perhaps codfish was not
really the peaceful kind of fish he had always
assumed. And, if those fishes eat each other, I
might as well eat the codfish immediately’.
Benjamin Franklin devoured the fried codfish to
his full and immediate satisfaction.
   This example illustrates how immediate
consumption may be misleadingly attractive. It
also shows how subject’s choice preferences may
change over time. When the tide goes out, our
desires often change. In particular, the example
illustrates the problem of self control and
temptation, which is part and parcel of daily life,
but unfortunately not of contemporary economics.
    It is often the case that people make decisions
about events that occur in different moments in
time. Some of these events concern minor issues
like eating or not eating some particular food at
some particular moment in time. But often these
types of decisions are related to major individual
concerns. For example, in decisions concerning
health subjects choose between an immediate
high level of consumption (e.g. drinking) and a
poor future, or a moderate level of immediate
consumption and prolonged health. Other
examples are the decision on when to get
pregnant, how much education to obtain and how
much to save for retirement. These type of
decisions are important not only at an individual
but on a global level as well.  For example, the
next Conference on Global Climate Change in
Japan will involve the weighing of the costs and
benefits between coal mining and forest clearing
today and global warming in a few decades.
   The relevance of the component of time for
decision making at the individual and global scale
has led a group of researchers from a variety of
scientific
disciplines to focus on a new area of decision
making, that is labelled: choice over time  or
intertemporal choice [1] [2]. The crucial question
in this field is: How much weight do and should
people put a future outcomes as compared to
present outcomes?
DISCOUNTED UTILITY THEORY
A central phenomenon in the field of
intertemporal choice is positive time preference.
Positive time preference refers to the observation
that individuals, man or animal alike-show a
systematic preference for receiving a commodity
immediately, rather than at some later moment in
time. People rather have one apple now than two
apples tomorrow; They prefer ‘Fl 100
immediately’ over ‘Fl 110 in 4 weeks’ [3].
Indeed, the most well documented observation in
the study of intertemporal choice is positive time
preference. Individuals like to be paid down on
the nail. The tendency to downgrade future
rewards or consumption has been observed with
pigeons, children and men [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
[10][11][12][13].
   Intertemporal choices are often analyzed with
the concept of time discounting and the
corresponding model of discounted utility. Time
discounting implies that the present value of a
promise is not the face value of the future
outcome, but that it is equivalent to the future
outcome discounted by a subjective discount rate.
Following the discounted utility model subjects
can be characterized by the discount rate by
which they devalue or discount future outcomes.
   Formally, we say that if an amount A of a good
will yield utility Ut after a delay of time t, the
utility of the outcome at the present (at time 0)
will be:
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We refer to U0 as the present value.  The variable
r designates the discount rate.  A decision maker
is said to have positive time preference, meaning
that outcomes are valued less the more they are
delayed, if r > 0.
   Thus, the discount utility model describes a
time-outcome value function that represents the
subjective value of an outcome occurring at
different moments in time. Subjective value then
is a monotonous function of outcome (e.g.
money) and time (e.g. delay). In the intertemporal
choice literature the devaluation per unit of time
is modelled either by exponential or hyperbolic
decay.
    Exponential decay is the traditional unit of
devaluation [14]. Exponential discounting implies
that each unit of time is discounted with a
constant fraction. Exponential discounting is
mostly used in studying questions on how people
should weight future outcomes. That is, it is
standard in normative approaches to intertemporal
choice.
    Recently, hyperbolic discounting has been
frequently suggested as the standard for the
descriptive approach of intertemporal
choice[1][8]. That is, for the study of how people
actually weight future outcomes. Hyperbolic
decay implies that the discount rate is not constant
but declines more rapidly over time. It is often
used to describe subject’s changes in preference
as time goes by, which cannot be described by the
normative approach. That is: they portray positive
time preference for the imminent future, but
negative time preference for the remote future.
    More specifically, people often prefer ‘one
apple today’ to ‘two apples tomorrow’; but they
prefer ‘two apples in a year and a day’ over ‘one
apple in a year’. Similarly, subjects prefer ‘$100
now’ over ‘$110 in four weeks’, but they prefer
‘$110 in 30 weeks’ to ‘$100 in 26 weeks’ [3]. The
point is that in contrast to exponential functions,
hyperbolic functions cross each other as a
function of time, thus being able to account for
possible switches in preferences [2].
    Roelofsma [15], Roelofsma & Keren[3], Keren
& Roelofsma [16] showed that these preference
reversals occur because of an immediacy effect.
Outcomes occurring later in time are perceived as
less certain. As a consequence the imminent
future receives a disproportionate weight in the
evaluation process. This explains positive time
preference for outcomes occurring in the
imminent future and negative time preference for
outcomes in the remote future.
HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING
Hyperbolic discounting has been applied in the
theoretical analysis of a variety of ‘irrationalities’
in intertemporal choice behavior in particular in
the study of temptation and self control. Read &
Roelofsma [17], for example, have combined the
notion of hyperbolic discounting with the notion
of ‘multiple selves’ in a theory of intrapersonal
dilemma’s that explains subjects problems with
temptation and self-control, in particular self
defeating behavior. Read & Roelofsma (1999)
argue that the phenomenon of the reversal of time
preference suggests that subjects behave as if
their choices are governed by at least two agents.
One of which is concerned with maximizing
future rewards (the principal or the planner) and
one of which is the agent who is concerned with
maximizing imminent rewards (the agent or the
doer). The internal conflict between the mutiple
selves charachterizes the conflict that is often
associated with problems like addiction,
procrastination and eating disorders. Figure 1
illustrates hyperbolic discounting and how
concept of multiple selves are incorporated in this
approach.
    Figure 1 represents time-outcome value
functions for two promises: the realization of a
virtue (Y) and the realization of a vice (X). In the
figure, the virtue is the larger reward that comes
at a later moment in time. The vice is the smaller
reward that comes earlier. For the virtue we can
take an event like ‘consuming a vegetarian meal’
and for the vice ‘consuming fish and chips’. In the
figure, the y-axis represents the utility of each of
the promises and the x-as represents the different
moments in time.
   As can be seen in the figure the utility function
for both promises becomes maximal at the
moment of realization, i.e. the moment of receipt.
It may be helpful for the reader to stress the point
that ‘real’ time on the x-axis moves from left to
right, that is: the realization of the promise gets
closer by moving from left to right on the x-axis.
More specifically, at the moment of receiving the
vice, e.g. fish and chips, the utility of the vice has
reached its maximal point. This is depicted as a
dotted circle in the figure. The present value of
‘receiving the vegetarian meal at a later moment
in time’, then, can be achieved by drawing a line
perpendicular to the x-as at this point. The
intersection between this line and the value
function of the virtue represents the present value
of the virtue. Since Figure 1 shows that utility of
the vice at the moment of its receipt is higher then
the present value of  the virtue meal at that same
moment, the subject will choose the vice and
consume the fish and chips.
   As mentioned earlier hyperbolic value functions
cross. This means that a point of indifference can
be determined for which the present value of the
vice equals the present value of the virtue. This
point is represented in Figure 1 as the intersection
between the value function of virtues (Y) and
vices (X). The point of indifference divides
subjects’ preferences in distinct intervals. Before
the point of indifference subjects will prefer the
vegetarian meal. After the point of indifference
they will prefer fish and chips. In the figure the
planner or principal, who is mainly concerned
with long term planning is the self before the
crossover point. The doer is the agent that makes
the decision. It is the agent that lives for the
moment and it is usually the one that prefers the
vice.
   Multiple self or multiple agent theory was
originally developed for multiple person
dilemma’s [18] but Read & Roelofsma showed
that the same theory can also be applied to
conflicts of interest within a single person. Each
person then is represented as the aggregate of
multiple selves, which share conflicting interests,
just like multiple selves in an organisation or a
society. Accordingly, intrapersonal dilemma’s are
dilemma’s that occur when people make choices
that are in the best interest of the self at the
moment of choice, but not necessarily for
themselves in the long run. By enforcing costs
and constraints on selves in the future people may
attempt to control their own behavior [17].
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
The most pervasive methodological problem in
the study of intertemporal choice concerns the
question of how to measure the discount rate.
This applies both for the normative approach
where the discount rate is assumed to be fixed per
unit of time as well as for the descriptive
approach where the discount rate is assumed to
decline rapidly over time.
    The standard procedure for measuring discount
rates is by the use of a method that determines
subject’s indifference [19][20][21][15] between
two outcomes that vary in time and outcome.
Accordingly, subjects can be required to provide
an indifference value by changing either the
outcome or time values for one of the options.
For example, subjects can be asked the following
question: For what amount will you be indifferent
between the following two choice options?
Receive:
$ 100, now or $____ in one year.
Suppose a subject is indifferent between receiving
$ 100 now and $ 125 in one year. Then, the
discount rate (r) can be calculated by putting these
values in formula [I], which will result in r =.25.
Indeed, most studies measure the indifference
between nominal amounts to derive the subjective
discount rate for utility.
   However this technique contains a serious
methodological flaw. It neglects the important
distinction between the discount rate for absolute
(nominal) amounts and the discount rate for
utility. Observe that the discount function in
formula [I] is defined over utility and not over
nominal amounts. The point is that the
relationship between amount and utility is not
linear. This fact has been known at least since
Bernoulli’s famous account on utility in 1738. For
example, a decision maker for whom r = .5 will
not necessarily be indifferent between $1 in one
period and 50¢ in the next period, because the
utility from $1 is unlikely to be twice the utility
from 50¢. As a results of the non-linear
relationship between utility and amount there will
always be systematic differences in the discount
rate for utility and the discount rate for amounts.
   This point is further illustrated in Figure 2. The
upperpart of the figure represents indifference
between nominal amounts occuring at different
moments in time, e.g. $ 100 now and $ 125 in one
year. The discount function used for nominal
amounts is also presented. As mentioned earlier
r=.25. The lower part of the figure represents the
corresponding utilities of the amounts and the
discount function for utility. For example, let
subjects utility functions be represented by the
square root of the nominal amount as is often
suggested [22]. If subjects are indifferent between
receiving ‘100 now’ and ‘125 in one year’ then,
with a square root utility function, subjects are
indifferent between a commodity with utility of
10 that is received immediately and a commodity
with a utility of 11 that is received in one year.
However, in terms of utility the discount rate
r=.11. This example clearly shows that calculating
the discount rate for nominal amounts and
assuming it to be the discount rate for utility can
be highly misleading.
  Surprisingly, however, all attempts by
experimentally minded economists and
psychologists to measure individual discount rates
have involved measuring discount rates for
nominal amounts rather than utilities [19]
[20][21][15]. We are aware of no previous study
in which empirical measures of individual utility
functions have been combined with measures of
time preference.   
 The distiction between the discount rate for
nominal amounts and the discount rate for utility
has important theoretical implications as well. We
will discuss them further below. First we will
discuss an alternative procedure to measure the
discount rate for utility that avoids this serious
methodological flaw.
THE PSYCHOPHYSICS OF THE
FUTURE
Roelofsma & Read [23] and Roelofsma, Schut
and Read [24] have developed a computer
programme Util for measuring the discount rate
for utility. Util integrates empirical measures of
time preference and utility. The programme uses a
two-stage cross modality matching paradigm, a
psychophysical measurement technique. In the
first stage, subjects matched numbers to areas
(rectangles, circles and squares) of different sizes.
Then a unique number-area size function is
estimated for each subject. In the second stage,
subjects indicated their utility for amount/delay
combinations by matching them to areas.
Refering back to  Figure 2,  this would be
represented by the values in the two circles at the
bottom of the figure. The matched areas are
transformed back into a utility scale using the
number-area size function. Refering to Figure 2
this is represented in the functions at the left and
right. Then, the programme estimates the discount
rates for utility. This is represented in the function
at the bottom of Figure 2. The programme also
measures, the discount rate for amounts, the
method used in the earlier studies. As mentioned
earlier this is represented in the function at the
upper part of Figure 2.
   The theoretical foundation for the cross
modality matching method that is used in Util, is
the Psychophysical Power Law. Psychophysics
have hypothesized for decades that there must be
some law that will describe the relationship
between the magnitude of an external stimuli (e.g.
sound or money) and the magnitude of the
internal psychological sensation (e.g.subjective
perceived loudness or subjective utility). Stevens
Psychophysical Power Law submerged as the
established psychophysical answer to this
question [34][35][36][37]. Stevens [34] showed
that each psychological sensation (Y) is a power
function of  the corresponding stimulus (f), or:
                           bfy k=                               [II].
That is, heaviness appears to be a power function
of weight, brightness a power function of
luminance, visual area is a power function of
projected square. Dozens of external stimulus
types have shown to relate to their corresponding
psychological sensations in terms of a power
function. Stevens also suggested that utility would
be a power function of nominal amounts of
money and Galanter provided the experimental
evidence for this assertion, both for monetary and
non-monetary goods [22] [25].
    In formula II the component k is a constant
reflecting a scale property and is not particulary
interesting. The power exponent b is the
important variable since it describes the sense
modality and is influenced by experimental
variables. Power functions in different sense
modalities tend to have different exponents.
When applied to the utility of money b is usually
< 1.
    The interesting point here is that when cross
modality matching is used, by matching
sensations in one sense modality to sensations
arising in another sense modality, the resulting
function is another power function. This means
that sensations of one sense modality can be
adequately used to measure sensations occuring in
another. For example, Stevens and Guirao [26] let
subjects make subjective judgements of loudness
using the length of a line as a measuring aid.
CMM has been shown to give very reliable
estimates of the real magnitude of the stimulus
[37]. Therefor, Roelofsma [15] suggested that
CMM may prove to be an important technique for
measuring discount utilities, since it eliminates
problems with magnitude estimation by
generating numbers, a problem that appears
particularly salient in the domain of intertemporal
choice [29][38].
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The distinction between the discount rate for
utility and the discount rate for money has
important theoretical implications as well. Several
phenomena in the field can be explained by the
systematic differences that occur when using
either the one or the other elicitation method.
    For example, a general finding in the empirical
literature on intertemporal choice is the gain/loss
effect[19][20][21][39]. The discount rate for
losses appears to be smaller than the discount rate
for gains. However, the studies that reported this
finding used the discount rate for nominal
amounts and not discount rate for utility. The
gain/loss effect could, however, occur because the
utility function for losses has a different form than
the utility function for gains.
     Indeed, one of the classic findings in the
decision making literature is that losses loom
larger that gains [27]. It is often suggested that the
utility function for losses is steeper and but more
elastic as compared to gains [27] [28].
    Roelofsma & Read [35] argued that the
gain/loss effect for amount is, in fact, compatible
with any possible gain/loss effect for utility. In a
series of experiments they measured discount
rates gains and losses for a one-year delay. Util
was used to measure the discount rate for utilities.
The traditional method, the discount rate for
nominal amounts was also used. Figure 3
illustrates the results of one of the experiments for
one year delays in gaining and losing dfl 500,
which equals about $250. The figure shows that
the discount rates for gains are indeed larger than
the discount rate for losses, but only when the
discount rate for amounts is measured. When the
discount rate for utility is measured, using the Util
procedure, there are no significant differences
between the discount rate for gains and losses.
Roelofsma & Read conclude that the gain/loss
asymmetry for nominal amounts results from
differences in subjects’ utility functions for gains
and losses.
SUGGESION FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
An important topic for further research is to
compare the utility measurement procedure of
Util with other utility measurement procedures
that can eventually be integrated with measures of
time preferences. Potential candidates are for
example the gamble trade off method [30] and the
lottery equiavalent method [31]. This type of
research is important not only for further
validation of the proposed techniques by
Roelofsma et al [24], but also to  study an
interesting issue related to the phenomena
described above: the difference between direct
estimation and comparative evaluation.
    Methods that use comparative evaluation let
subjects compare between options in order to
derive a value function. For example, subjects can
be asked to indicate for what amount they would
be indifferent between receiving $ 100, now  or
$____ in one year. It is often suggested that in
this type of choice subjects are likely to use a
comparative choice process, that is: they value the
option ‘100, now’ not in absolute terms but only
relative to the value of the alternative that is
received in one year. [32]. This type of choice
process however is open to its own type of bias
[34].
    Methods that use direct estimates however, like
Util, require subjects to match directly the
absolute attractiveness, e.g. of  ‘$100, now’ with
for example the area of a circle. Both methods can
be used to measure utility and it would be
interesting to what extent they lead to systematic
differences.
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